Payday loans are widely condemned as a "predatory debt trap." We test that claim by researching how households in Georgia and North Carolina have fared since those states banned payday loans in May 2004 and December 2005. Compared with households in states where payday lending is permitted, households in Georgia have bounced more checks, complained more to the Federal Trade Commission about lenders and debt collectors, and filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection at a higher rate. North Carolina households have fared about the same. This negative correlation-reduced payday credit supply, increased credit problems-contradicts the debt trap critique of payday lending, but is consistent with the hypothesis that payday credit is preferable to substitutes such as the bounced-check "protection" sold by credit unions and banks or loans from pawnshops.
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The payday loan industry depicts itself as a financial crutch propping up struggling borrowers until their next paycheck. In truth, the loans are financial straitjackets that squeeze the working poor into a spiral of mounting debt (Atlanta (GA) Journal-Constitutional Editorial, 12/8/2003) 
I. Introduction
In 1933 President Roosevelt closed all banks in the U.S. The "bank holiday" was a desperate effort to calm bank depositors and halt the runs that were draining money and credit from circulation.
In 2004 and 2005 the governments of Georgia and North Carolina permanently closed all the payday lenders operating in their state. Payday lenders are "fringe banks" (Caskey 1994 ): small, street-level stores selling $300 loans for two weeks at a time to millions of mostly lower middle income urban households and members of the military.
The credit is popular with customers, but despised by critics, hence the bans in Georgia and North Carolina. This paper investigates whether those "payday holidays" helped households in those states. Why might less credit help? Because payday loans, unlike loans from mainstream lenders, are considered "debt traps" (Center for Responsible Lending 2003) . 1 The debt trap critique against payday lenders seems based on three facts: payday loans are expensive ("usurious"), payday lenders locate near their customers ("targeting"), and most payday customers are repeat ("trapped") borrowers. After documenting that the typical customer borrows 8 to 12 times per year, the CRL (Center for Responsible Lending) concluded:
…borrowers are forced to pay high fees every two weeks just to keep an existing loan outstanding that they cannot afford to pay off. This …"debt trap" locks borrowers into revolving high-priced short-term credit instead of …reasonably priced longer-term credit (Ernst, Farris, and King 2003, p. 2) 2 The CRL study went on to estimate that 5 million trapped American families were paying $3.4 billion annually to "predatory" payday lenders. 2 The debt trap critique has influenced lawmakers at every level to restrict payday credit or ban it outright. Oakland and San Francisco limit the number and location of payday stores. Oregon and Pennsylvania recently joined Georgia and North Carolina in banning payday loans. New York, New Jersey, and most New England states have never granted entry.
3 By contrast, some western states (Washington, Idaho, Utah, and until recently New Mexico) have maintained relatively laissez-faire policies toward payday lending. That patchwork regulation means that millions of people use payday credit repeatedly in some states, while their counterparts in other states go without. However one sees payday credit-as helpful or harmful-the uneven regulations means millions of households are potentially being wronged.
We test the debt trap hypothesis by investigating whether Georgia and North
Carolina households had fewer financial problems, relative to households in other states, after payday credit was banned. The study we depart from is Stegman and Faris (2003) .
They find that "pre-existing" debt problems--bounced checks or contact by debt collectors--were the most significant predictors of payday credit demand by lower income households in North Carolina. 4 We follow up by researching whether problems 2 The CRL study did not distinguish repeat borrowing from serial borrowing (rolling the same loan over and over). The relative extent of serial and repeat borrowing is still not entirely clear. 3 At the federal level, the Military Personnel Financial Services Protection Act of 2006 effectively prohibits payday loans to soldiers and other military personnel. 4 Stegman and Farris (2001) conclude that payday lending encourages "chronic" borrowing, but stop short of recommending bans of payday lending lest borrowers resort to more expensive, "underground" credit. They relate a telling anecdote: in states that prohibit payday loans, loan "sharks" have been observed at check cashing stores, waiting to collect from borrowers who have just cashed their work paychecks. The 3 go down when payday credit gets banned. Is payday credit part of the problem, or part of the solution?
We study patterns of returned (bounced) checks at Federal Reserve check processing centers, complaints against lenders and debt collectors filed by households with the FTC (Federal Trade Commission), and federal bankruptcy filings. The monthly complaints data are new to this study; we obtained them from the FTC under the Freedom of Information Act. We use changes in complaints within a state to identify changes in household welfare (well-being), a distinct advantage compared to the ambiguous measures (interest rates and repeat borrowing) emphasized by critics of payday lending. How do we know when credit is so expensive or burdensome that households are better off without it? The real test is whether household welfare is higher with or without payday credit, and complaints are a measure of welfare.
Most of our findings contradict the debt trap hypothesis. Relative to other states, households in Georgia bounced more checks after the ban, complained more about lenders and debt collectors, and were more likely to file for bankruptcy under Chapter 7.
The changes are substantial. On average, the Federal Reserve check processing center in Our findings may not be consistent with Skiba and Tobacman (2006) . Using data from a single large payday lender in Texas, they find "suggestive but inconclusive evidence" (p. 1) that payday loan applicants who are denied loans are less likely than applicants granted loans to file for rescheduling of their debts under Chapter 13 of the bankruptcy Act. By contrast, filings under Chapter 7 were not affected. We too find lower Chapter 13 filings after payday loans are banned (denial at the state level) but we find higher Chapter 7 filings. Now recall that rescheduling under Chapter 13 is for filers with substantial assets to protect, while Chapter 7 ("no assets") is for everyone else, including, as seems likely, most payday borrowers. Combined with our findings of more bounced checks and more problems with debt collectors, we take our results as evidence of a slipping down in the lives of would-be payday borrowers: fewer bother to 7 The CRL argues that Morgan (2007) Ancillary tests show that Hawaiians' debt problems (complaints) declined and became less chronic after the payday loan limit was doubled. Section VI concludes.
II. Payday Credit and its Critics
Here we describe the payday credit market -the loan, the people who demand payday loans, and the firms that supply them -and critics' objection to the market.
The loan. The typical payday loan is $300 for two weeks (Stegman 2007) . The typical price is about $45 ($15/$100), implying an annual percentage rate (APR) of 390 percent. Payday lenders require proof of employment (pay stubs) and a bank statement.
Some lenders require only that, others may also check Equifax to see if the borrower has defaulted on previous payday loans. If approved, the borrower gives the lender a postdated check for the loan amount plus interest, say $345. Two weeks later the lenders 9 Credit constrained borrowers may also resort to selling assets, thus obviating filing for Chapter 13. Increased asset sales after the ban were reported to us by a large (one of the big five) payday lender that also operates pawnshops, and we also found lower auto repossession rates after Hawaii doubled the payday loan limit (repossession rates are not available for North Carolina and Georgia Supply. The number of payday credit stores has grown from essentially zero in the mid-1990s to over 20,000 today. As with mainstream banks, the distribution of payday lending firms is bimodal: a handful of very large corporate firms operate thousands of payday stores in virtually every state that allows it, while hundreds of small firms operate just a few stores within a single city, state, or region. Several of the multistate firms have publicly traded stock. Stegman (2007) documents the phenomenal expansion in the number of payday stores in states that permit them. In just five years, store numbers in Ohio and Oregon doubled, and in Arizona they tripled. Nationally, payday lenders are said to outnumber McDonald's restaurants (Stegman 2007) .
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While rapid entry suggests low entry costs and/or high expected returns, recent profitability studies find relatively normal returns. After analyzing firm level data provided by two large payday lending corporations, Flannery and Samolyk (2005) conclude that payday lending prices seem roughly commensurate with costs. Huckstep (2007) concludes similarly after examining costs and returns of publicly traded payday lending firms. Normal returns suggest entry and competition work to limit payday loan 9 prices and profits. Using "found data" Morgan (2007) finds lower payday loan prices in cities with more payday stores per capita, consistent with the competition hypothesis.
13
Against payday lending. Payday lenders' many critics include consumer advocates, journalists, competitors, and increasingly, the government at all levels.
14 Their main objections, again, are "targeting" (women, minorities, and soldiers), high prices, and repeat borrowing. Payday lenders are said to locate near their prey, then hook them on expensive credit they cannot payoff. Repeat borrowing is seen as proving the debt trap hypothesis: borrowers are tempted into borrowing $300 for two weeks expecting to pay $45, but wind up paying many times that amount as they borrow repeatedly.
The CRL (Center for Responsible Lending), a non-profit, non-partisan research institute headquartered in North Carolina, has been an especially influential of payday lending in particular and predatory lending in general. The CRL is affiliated with Self Help credit union. 15 After finding the typical payday customer borrows 8 to 13 times per year, the CRL estimated that payday lenders extracted $3.4 billion per year from "trapped" households (that borrowed more than 5 times per year). Those findings were cited by the Chairman of the NAACP (National Association for the Advancement of Colored People) in an editorial published by the Atlanta Journal Constitutional while the Georgia legislature was debating whether to ban payday lending:
"the dirty secret of payday lending is that its business model is utterly dependent on extracting huge fees from those borrowers unable to pay the loan back." ( 
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Before we investigate whether those payday credit bans improved households' financial health, we contemplate the debt trap critique that prompted the ban. The stratagems in those theories seem more complicated than the debt trap critique levied against payday lenders. 20 Critics maintain that payday credit is prohibitively expensive, meaning repayment of the full $345 required for the typical two week loan is beyond borrowers' reach; the best borrowers can do is extend the loan indefinitely.
III. Debt Trap Concepts
That debt trap concept seems closer to the "poverty trap" model in Sachs (1983) .
His model shows how a nation gets mired in poverty if its debt burden becomes too great. 
The sustainable debt-income is increasing in income growth (n) and decreasing in the interest rate r; the more debt cost, the less the household can afford. An exogenous increase in r will push households that were in sustainable financial condition onto a path of unsustainable debt accumulation and compounding problems. Critics may see advent of expensive payday credit as just such an interest rate shock.
The model tells us that the variable we would like to identify is the marginal cost of credit after payday credit gets banned. Short of knowing whether the alternatives offered by banks and credit unions are preferable, our strategy is to test whether households debt problems subside after the ban. 22 If the substitutes are cheaper, or less entrapping, households should look financially better off after the ban.
IV. Financial Problems
We study three financial problems that seem endemic to payday borrowers: (1) returned checks, (2) complaints against lenders and debt collectors, and (3) bankruptcy.
We think of bounced checks as a small setback that might cascade into problems with debt collectors, or even bankruptcy. 27 Thus, a rash of bounced checks might be the initial setback that leads to more severe problems.
Complaints against Lenders and Debt Collectors (Informal Bankruptcy).
Borrowers who default (quit paying debt) without officially filing for bankruptcy protection are subject to debt collection efforts by lenders and debt collectors, including wage garnishment, foreclosure, and asset repossession. Dawsey and Ausubel (2004) • Exaggerating amount or legal status of debts (43%)
• Calling continuously, before 8 am, or after 9 pm (24.6%)
• Repeatedly calling family, friends, and neighbors (11%)
• Obscene language (12%)
• False threats of dire consequences (9.6%)
• Impermissible calls to employer (6.3%)
• Revealing debt to 3 rd parties (4.5%)
• Threatened violence (0.4%).
We consider complaints the most revealing of the three debt problems we study, for several reasons. First, complaints measure welfare-households are sufficiently bothered to appeal to the government for protection. 29 Second, the data are monthly.
Third, they are intuitive. Recalling the model above, suppose a sudden rise in interest rates causes a household to default. Dunning by lenders and third party collectors follow.
Until the defaulter files for bankruptcy, collection efforts escalate: wages get garnished, assets get repossessed. The most aggrieved defaulters will complain, and the tally of their complaints will register the financial shock like a simple seismograph. We maintain that variations in per capita complaints within a state reflect changes in household problems, rather than changes in debt collectors' practices. Collectors may become more or less aggressive over the business cycle, but that can be controlled for using state unemployment rates. 
Changes in Problems after Payday Credit Bans
Before we calculate precisely how each problem changed, we look at some pictures showing the trends in problems in each state relative to all other states. Returned check rates at the Atlanta and Charlotte check procession centers, particularly the rate per check, surged about the time Georgia and North Carolina banned payday loans (Chart 5a). 36 Were it not for the fluke drop at the Charlotte cpc shortly before the NC ban, returned checks there would be off the scale. 37 Complaints against lenders and debt collectors (informal bankruptcy) obviously increased in Georgia (Chart 5b). Complaints in North Carolina veered upward somewhat before the ban, but complaints appear 34 The data before 2000 are from Dick and Lehnert (2007) . The rest are from the American Bankruptcy Institute. 35 Ashcraft, Dick, and Morgan (2007) analyze the impact of BAPCPA on borrowers and lenders. 36 In 2004, the Atlanta cpc also processed checks for institutions Chattanooga, Tennessee. In personal correspondence, a project manager at the Atlanta cpc estimated that about 2/3 of checks processed at the Atlanta cpc in 2004 were drawn on financial institutions in Georgia. To the extent the Atlanta cpc processes checks drawn on financial institutions outside of Georgia, the impact of the payday ban in Georgia will be attenuated, e.g., the ban would have no effect on returned checks at the Boston cpc. 37 The decline in returned checks rates at the Charlotte NC cpc in 2004 reflects that operations were transferred there from the Columbia SC cpc as part of the Federal Reserve's consolidation effort. http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/Press/other/2003/20030206/default.htm In personal correspondence, a project manager at the Charlotte cpc estimated that about 50 percent of checks processed at that cpc were drawn on NC institutions. To the extent the Charlotte cpc processes checks from outside North Carolina, the effect of the North Carolina payday ban on returned checks at the Charlotte cpc will be attenuated.
visited 1/28/2010 19 consistently higher afterwards. Chapter 7 bankruptcy filing rates rose in Georgia and North Carolina after the ban while Chapter 13 filing rates fell (Chart 5c-5d). Returned checks per 100 checks processed at the Atlanta cpc increased by 0.02 percent after the ban (diff1). Returned checks per 100 at all other cpc declined by 0.14 Georgians had a lot more problems with lenders and debt collectors after the ban.
Differences-in-Differences (diffs-in-diffs)
The difference-in-difference for complaints against debt collectors was 0.7 per 100,000, a 64 percent increase compared to the pre-ban average. Complaints against lenders also went up, but not so much. 
Which lenders were the object of complaints by Georgians is something we can only wonder about (we do not have that information); presumably it was whichever lenders replaced payday lenders. 21 that does not seem to fit the profile of payday borrowers. We would expect bankrupt payday borrowers to wind up in "no asset" Chapter 7 bankruptcy.
In sum, what we saw in Georgia after the ban was more bounced checks, more problems with lenders debt collectors (informal bankruptcy), more bankruptcy under chapter 7, but lower bankruptcy under chapter 13. Here is how we interpret those facts.
The contraction in payday credit supply caused former borrowers to bounce more checks, thus aggravating their already marginal circumstances. To stave off bankruptcy, distressed borrowers pawned or sold assets. 41 For those who ultimately succumbed to their financial problems, the loss of assets made chapter 7 the natural choice. Others slipped into informal bankruptcy (defaulted without filing). Though sad to say, that slipping down, with less rescheduling of debts, but more "deadbeats" and "no asset"
bankruptcies, seems to fit the picture a marginal payday customer pushed over the edge.
North Carolina banned payday credit in December 2005. With so few quarters elapsed, and a potentially confounding event (bankruptcy reform), we advise treating our
North Carolina results as preliminary. 42 That said, the difference-in-differences for North Carolina tell the same story (Table 2 ). Bounced check rates at the Charlotte (NC)
processing center rose relative to other processing centers after the ban, although the increases were not significant. Total complaints against lenders and debt collectors rose by over a third relative to other states. Chapter 7 filing rates were higher in NC, relative to other states, while Chapter 13 filing rates were lower. The rise in Chapter 7 filings 41 In fact, increased asset sales after the ban were reported to us by a large (one of the big five) payday lender that also operates pawnshops. Thus, we interpret the "suggestive but inconclusive" increase in chapter 13 filing risk after receipt of payday loans found by Skiba and Tobacman (2006) as evidence that the extra credit obviated asset sales but not, alas, bankruptcy. 42 The bankruptcy reform would have to have a more pronounced effect in North Carolina to explain the relative increases in chapter 7 filing rates. Ashcraft, Dick, and Morgan (2007) find the rush to file before visited 1/28/2010 22 exceeded the decline in Chapter 13 filings (unlike in Georgia), so total filings were higher after the ban in North Carolina. Overall, the results for North Carolina are mostly consistent with the results for Georgia, and mostly inconsistent with the debt trap hypothesis.
Regression Analysis
We confirmed the results above using multivariate regression equations that control for unemployment and other differences between states: variables. 43 The c and d coefficients measure the difference between the mean of DEP VAR for Georgia and all other states and the difference between the mean for all states the new law was higher in high exemption states and lower average credit scores. North Carolina has a relatively low ($10,000) exemption, suggesting a less pronounced effect. 43 For example, GA equals one if s = Georgia, zero otherwise. POST_BAN_GA equals one after May 2005, zero before.
visited 1/28/2010 23 before and after the ban. Likewise for e and f. We do not report those coefficients to keep the focus on g and n: those measure the difference-in-difference in problems between GA or NC and other states before the ban and after. The debt trap implies g < 0 and n < 0.
The results (Table 3) show that bankruptcy rates were positively related to unemployment, not surprisingly, but complaints against lenders and debt collectors (informal bankruptcy) were negatively related to unemployment. There could be two reasons for that negative correlation. Unemployed workers do not need protection from wage garnishment, for one. And perhaps debt collectors are less persistent with unemployed defaulters (whom they reach at home) because they believe unemployed defaulters who claim penury.
The other results confirm the diffs-in-diffs above. The Atlanta and Charlotte cpc returned more checks after the ban, though the latter was insignificant. Total complaints (against lenders and debt collectors) rose significantly after the ban. Chapter 7 filing rates were higher in Georgia after the ban, but Chapter 13 filings rates (and total filings) were lower. Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 filing rates rose in North Carolina.
More payday Credit, More Problems? Not in Hawaii
How do we know the problems associated with payday credit bans are not merely temporary "withdrawal" symptoms preceding a healthier, financial life lived without payday credit? For one, the extra problems were not temporary (Chart 5). As further evidence against the withdrawal/addiction hypothesis, we show that problems subside when larger "doses" of payday credit are allowed Regressions results indicate just the opposite (Table 4) . 45 Total complaints against lenders and debt collectors rose after Hawaii doubled the loan limit. 46 The diffin-diff in total complaints (0.3) represents a 50 percent decline compared to average before the limit doubled. Bankruptcy filings under chapter 13 rose, but filings under
Chapter 7 fell by more, so total filings fells. The diff-in-diff for total filings (2.6) represents a decline of 27 percent relative to average before the limit was raised.
Does Payday Credit Prolong Problems?
The results thus far suggest household credit problems go opposite the supply of We implement the test by regressing total complaints against lenders and debt collectors in Hawaii on six lags of itself, then comparing the implied dynamics before and after the doubling. 48 That strategy entails splitting the sample then estimating seven numbers (six coefficients and a constant) over each sub-sample, so our degrees of freedom are limited. We study only the monthly series (complaints) and only in Hawaii, where we have sufficient post-event data. This ancillary test is limited: were Hawaiians' problems more chronic once they had access to larger payday loans?
The results suggest just the opposite (Chart 6). Before the payday loan limit doubled, problems with (complaints against) debt collectors lasted about 7 months. After the doubling, such problems were over within the month. 46 Complaints against lenders in Hawaii rose. We cannot say whether the extra complaints were against payday lenders but it is possible; once the loan limit doubled, payday lenders had more skin in the game. 47 If -b 2 < ac < 1-b 2 , problems are chronic, but not explosive. Those conditions on c follow from (1) calculating steady state problems where p* is constant over time and (2) inspecting how p -p* evolves. 48 Simply estimating an AR(2) (2 nd order auto-regression) and examining the DP 2 coefficient takes the particular model above too literally. In a model with more lags, c would be distributed elsewhere.
VI. Conclusion
Georgians and North Carolinians do not seem better off since their states outlawed payday credit: they have bounced more checks, complained more about lenders and debt collectors, and have filed for Chapter 7 ("no asset") bankruptcy at a higher rate.
The increase in bounced checks represents a potentially huge transfer from depositors to banks and credit unions. Banning payday loans did not save Georgian households $154 million per year, as the CRL projected, it cost them millions per year in returned check fees.
The increased problems are not just "withdrawal" symptoms preceding a healthier financial life without payday credit. The problems do not appear temporary, for one, plus we find that Hawaiians had fewer and less chronic problems after the maximum legal "dose" of payday credit was doubled.
While our findings contradict the debt trap/addiction hypothesis against payday lending, they are consistent with alternative hypothesis that payday credit is cheaper than the bounce "protection" that earns millions for credit unions and banks.
49 Forcing households to replace costly credit with even costlier credit is bound to make them worse off. 49 Consider this pitch by for bounce protection in creditunion.com: "Today's economy has compelled many credit unions to pursue creative non-interest income solutions to address ailing bottom lines --and overdraft payment services fit that need. visited 1/28/2010 
